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 Modern financial repression  
in the euro area crisis:  
making high public debt sustainable?  
 
By Ad van Riet 
European Central Bank1 
The sharp rise in public debt-to-GDP ratios in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 posed serious  
challenges for fiscal policy in the euro area countries and culminated for some member states in a  
sovereign debt crisis. This note examines the public policy responses to the euro area crisis through the lens 
of financial repression with a particular focus on how they contributed to easing government budget  
constraints. Financial repression is defined in this context as the government’s strategy – supported by  
monetary and financial policies – to gain privileged access to capital markets at preferential credit  
conditions and divert resources to the state with the aim to secure and, if necessary, enforce public debt  
sustainability.  
 
Following a narrative approach, this note finds that public debt management and resolution, European  
financial legislation, EMU crisis support and ECB monetary policy have significantly contributed to  
relieving sovereign liquidity and solvency stress and generated fiscal space through non-standard means. The 
respective authorities have in fact applied the tools of financial repression to restore stability after the euro 
area crisis. 
 
1 This policy note draws on van Riet (2018). The views expressed are those of the author and should not be reported 
as representing the views of the European Central Bank. Comments from Sylvester Eijffinger, Lex Hoogduin and two 
referees are gratefully acknowledged. © Ad van Riet, May 2018. 
JEL-codes: E63, F38, F45, G18, G28, H12, H63. 
Keywords: fiscal sustainability, public debt management, financial regulation, monetary policy, financial  
repression, euro area crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The sharp rise in public debt-to-GDP ratios in the  
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 posed serious  
challenges for fiscal policy in the euro area countries. 
Euro area governments have undertaken a range of  
countervailing and confidence-building measures, 
focused on fiscal consolidation, asset privatisation 
and structural reforms, in addition to measures to 
improve the resilience of the banking sector and 
break the sovereign-bank nexus at the national level. 
 
Apart from these standard responses to fiscal stress, 
history suggests that crisis-hit countries might also 
turn to non-standard financial repression techniques 
in an effort to stabilise public finances, i.e. a suite of 
coercive measures imposed on the financial and 
monetary system – exploiting national regulators and 
the central bank – to gain privileged access to capital 
markets at preferential credit conditions and to  
divert resources to the state (see Reinhart et al., 
2015).2 The main purpose of financial repression 
from a fiscal perspective is to sustain debt financing 
at affordable interest rates but it may also entail a 
confiscation of assets to reduce a debt overhang. 
These capital market interventions could be vital to 
restore the state’s debt issuing capacity and thus its 
ability to implement a fiscal stimulus. 
 
Considering the historical experience, these short-
term fiscal advantages of financial repression could 
come at significant longer-term costs. Since a  
financial repression regime circumvents or  
undermines market-based budgetary discipline, the 
government could decide to postpone or put off 
standard measures of fiscal retrenchment, leaving the 
overhang of public debt unaddressed. Pressing  
financial institutions to hold more own sovereign 
debt makes them vulnerable to adverse fiscal shocks 
that lead to valuation losses and weaken their  
balance sheets. A privileged capital market access for 
the public sector may crowd out private borrowers 
and, hence, translate in a lower potential growth path 
of the economy. Moreover, monetary policy  
interventions in the sovereign bond market aimed at 
keeping interest rates low on a protracted basis could 
cause a low-quality capital structure, spur excessive 
risk-taking, and entail a redistribution of income 
from savers to borrowers. Hence, financial repression 
raises questions of economic efficiency, financial  
stability and political legitimacy.  
 
This note examines the policy responses to the euro 
area crisis through the historical lens of financial  
repression with a focus on the consequences for  
public finances (see also van Riet, 2018). The  
question is whether and how the authorities have 
applied financial repression methods again in  
modern times and as a result – intended or  
unintended – relieved fiscal stress. The note reviews 
in turn national public debt management, European 
financial governance, official sector support and  
public debt resolution, and the ECB’s monetary policy 
interventions (Sections 2 to 5). The conclusion is that 
these crisis-related public policies were targeted at 
restoring euro area stability but also generated  
significant fiscal benefits (Section 6). This could  
signal a new “age of financial repression” (Eijffinger 
and Mujagic, 2012). 
 
2. National public debt management  
 
Membership of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) removes a country’s control over monetary 
policy and the exchange rate and constrains the set of 
tools that it has available to respond to a negative 
shock. A crisis that feeds market fears of a sovereign 
default and euro exit may quickly trigger capital  
outflows and higher interest rates. Due to contagion 
effects even a solvent euro area country could see a 
liquidity crisis quickly turning into a self-fulfilling 
default (De Grauwe, 2012; Eijffinger et al., 2018).  
 
Euro area governments affected by the sovereign 
debt crisis accordingly looked for ways to ease their 
liquidity and solvency constraints by more actively 
2 The term ‘financial repression’ can be traced back to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), who studied how developing 
countries with incomplete capital markets repressed their financial system. But financial repression also has a long  
history in advanced economies with more developed capital markets, especially to ease the government budget  
constraint during and after episodes of war and crisis, when it took the form of administrative controls on bank rates and 
capital flows, suppressed sovereign bond yields, directed credit, monetary financing, capital levies, etc. (Alesina, 1988; 
Aloy et al., 2014; Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2015).  
 Modern financial repression in the euro area crisis: making high public debt sustainable? 
 
www.suerf.org/policynotes               SUERF Policy Note No 34 3 
managing both the supply and demand of  
government debt in response to the sudden retreat of 
foreign investors and rapidly rising sovereign bond 
yields. On the one hand, public debt managers tried 
to make issuance conditions more attractive and  
better attuned to domestic audiences to secure  
continued market access at affordable interest rates 
(Hoogduin et al., 2011; Holler, 2013). On the other 
hand, several euro area countries embraced certain 
aspects of financial repression to attract a higher  
interest in low-cost sovereign debt from a captive 
domestic investor base.3 
 
At the start of the sovereign debt crisis, financial  
repression mainly showed up in unusual forms of 
public debt management. Domestic banks faced  
supervisory pressure to repatriate funds from abroad 
and moral suasion to invest in bonds issued by their 
own government (Ongena et al., 2016). They were 
also confronted with political pressure to take  
advantage of cheap ECB liquidity offered at an  
unusual three-year maturity and to park these funds 
in national government bonds. After the earlier  
relaxation of eligibility criteria, lower-rated sovereign 
debt securities could still be pledged as collateral in 
the ECB’s credit operations, albeit with a discount. 
Sometimes, temporary ceilings placed on the  
remuneration of retail bank deposits created  
incentives for savers to shift their wealth into  
government bonds.  
 
Also pension funds and insurance corporations were 
subject to moral suasion and regulatory pressure, 
pushing them to invest more at home, in particular in 
public debt. A few crisis-hit countries used the  
reserves accumulated by pension funds to fill holes in 
the government budget and to limit the need for  
official financial assistance. Furthermore, taxes on 
financial transactions and administrative controls  
constraining the free functioning of securities  
markets introduced barriers against speculation and 
often also promoted investment in government 
bonds.  
 
3 Chari et al. (2016) show that a crisis-affected government faced with the need to issue a large amount of debt should use 
financial repression techniques, in particular by obliging local financial intermediaries to hold more public debt on their 
balance sheet until the crisis has passed and the extra debt has been run down.  
Figure 1: Ownership of euro area government debt and interest payments, 1995-2016  
(percent of GDP) 
Source: ECB and Eurostat. 
Note: Euro area comprises the first 12 member countries. Government debt is defined in gross 
terms and consolidated across general government. The concept of resident/foreign owners of 
debt applies at the national level.  
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Public debt management operations had a significant 
impact on the contribution of domestic investors to 
the financing of euro area government debt (Figure 
1). Over the first 10 years of the euro’s existence, the 
share of non-residents in total government debt 
showed a steady rise and that of residents  
accordingly declined, especially for smaller member 
countries. With the onset of the euro area crisis, this 
trend has gone into reverse, notably in the crisis-
affected countries. This reversal may reflect both  
economic considerations (the sell-off by foreign  
investors and the greater attractiveness of public 
debt to domestic audiences) as well as the application 
of financial repression techniques to resident  
investors under political control (De Marco and  
Macchiavelli, 2016) that leads to an artificial home 
demand for government debt securities and helps to 
contain the rise in debt interest payments. 
 
3. European financial governance 
 
The European Banking Union with its centralised 
banking supervision and resolution as well as  
Europe’s action plan for a Capital Markets Union  
constrain the ability of national authorities to repress 
the financial sector and domestic capital markets 
(Ve ron, 2012, 2014). At the same time, a growing 
body of European legislation that was introduced 
over the period 2008-2017 to promote a sound  
financial sector and enhance financial stability also 
contributes to easing governments’ access to capital 
on a structural basis.  
 
The crisis-induced home bias discussed above was 
further supported by the preferential treatment of  
government debt in revamped EU financial sector 
legislation. EU prudential banking law (the Capital  
Requirements Regulation and Capital Requirements 
Directive IV) offers supervisors ample opportunity to 
allow the banks in their jurisdiction to consider all 
their claims on Member States denominated and 
funded in the domestic currency as high-quality and 
liquid assets free of credit risk against which in most 
cases no capital or liquidity buffers need to be  
maintained, irrespective of the size of the sovereign 
exposure. This favourable treatment of public debt 
stands in contrast with the strict prudential  
requirements for bank holdings of corporate debt and 
it preserves an artificial level of demand for debt  
issued by less creditworthy governments. The  
corresponding sovereign funding privilege is of  
particular advantage to euro area countries, since 
they share the same currency and therefore can  
attract credit institutions from the whole monetary 
union on equal regulatory conditions.4 
 
Government funding privileges can also be found in 
EU prudential legislation for other parts of the  
financial sector. Under the new Solvency II directive, 
insurance companies must hold adequate capital 
against an array of risks related to their investments: 
the so-called Solvency Capital Requirement. However, 
the standard calculation formula assigns a capital  
exemption to claims on or guaranteed by European 
governments issued in their own currency with  
regard to market risks associated with spread risk 
(i.e. the sensitivity to credit spreads over the risk-free 
interest rate) and concentration risk (i.e. a large  
exposure to default of a counterparty or the lack of 
asset diversification). Such sovereign risks are only 
covered by the need for insurance companies to  
undertake an adequate own risk and solvency  
assessment.  
 
Furthermore, the revised EU investment funds  
directive (UCITS IV) gives the national competent  
authorities, as before, considerable freedom to  
authorise collective investment undertakings to  
invest sizeable amounts in transferable securities and 
money market instruments that are issued or  
guaranteed by single public sector bodies in Europe. 
The applicable concentration limits may be waived 
and the counterparty exposure limit for sovereigns 
far exceeds those for private issuers. 
 
The EU regulation on money market funds contains 
similar derogations with regard to concentration  
limits and diversification requirements for money 
market instruments issued or guaranteed by central 
governments, which are always assumed to be  
eligible liquid assets of high credit quality. A  
favourable assessment of their eligibility is also not 
4 Negotiations at the international level to remove or reduce the preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign exposure 
in banking law have not led to any consensus (see BCBS, 2017). 
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needed. This preferential treatment of public sector 
versus private sector issuers is partly mitigated by 
the requirement that money market funds undertake 
sound stress tests and must have prudent and  
rigorous procedures in place for managing their total 
liquidity risk and are able to deal with redemption 
pressures. European money market funds that aim to 
maintain a constant net asset valuation per unit of 
share (so-called CNAV funds) are no longer allowed 
to invest in private debt instruments but only in  
public debt. The presumed quality and liquidity of 
sovereign assets is expected to mitigate the systemic 
risk from potential investor runs. The European  
Commission has been requested to report within five 
years on the role of money market funds in public 
debt markets and the feasibility of establishing a  
quota whereby at least 80% of the assets of these 
CNAV funds are to be invested in EU public debt  
instruments.  
 
The European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR) seeks to allay the financial stability concerns 
related to transactions in derivative markets such as 
credit default swaps. This market regulation  
demands central reporting of all derivative contracts 
and central clearing of standardised over-the-counter 
derivative transactions through a recognised  
counterparty. The necessary posting of high-quality 
liquid collateral to cover the exposure to clearing  
parties in principle raises the regulatory demand for 
sovereign bonds. At the same time, EMIR exempts 
official public debt management operations.  
Moreover, the central counterparties are required to 
observe similar capital adequacy rules as banks and, 
hence, the same preferential regulatory treatment of 
their claims on European sovereigns applies as  
discussed above.  
 
European capital market legislation shows attempts to 
silence market voices of concern about fiscal  
developments, leading to more subdued government 
interest rates. New EU regulations prohibit investors 
from purchasing uncovered sovereign default  
protection, introduce restrictions on the short-selling 
of government bonds and impose supervisory  
constraints on agencies issuing sovereign credit  
ratings. Moreover, the proposed common financial 
transactions tax through which 10 euro area  
countries plan to fight speculative market activity 
might exempt trading in government bonds and in 
that case would create a further sovereign funding 
privilege in addition to the extra public revenues that 
it generates.  
 
4. Official sector support and public debt  
resolution 
 
To safeguard financial stability in the euro area as a 
whole, the European authorities established  
stabilisation mechanisms that offer market access 
support, precautionary credit lines and temporary 
loans to help governments facing liquidity stress. 
With the aim to counteract the related moral hazard, 
they introduced contractual arrangements that 
should enable insolvent euro area countries to  
resolve their public debt overhang in an orderly  
fashion. 
 
Several euro area countries received conditional 
EU/IMF loans after having lost access to the capital 
market in order to help them bridge their gross  
borrowing needs until they had credibly adjusted 
their economy and regained investor confidence 
(Figure 2). As observed by Corsetti et al. (2017), the 
terms of official lending were eased several times in 
interaction with public debt sustainability concerns 
and market access constraints, leading to the  
granting of higher loan volumes, lower financing 
costs, longer maturities, deferred interest payments 
and extended grace periods. The significant  
budgetary savings and the smoother refinancing  
profiles due to this form of debt relief contributed to 
declining sovereign bond yields and helped the  
programme countries to return to the capital market.  
 
Considering public debt resolution, as Greece  
received its first EU/IMF financial support package in 
May 2010, euro area finance ministers initially called 
on their domestic banks to share the funding burden 
and tried to persuade them to hold on to the  
impaired Greek government debt (Bastasin, 2015). 
Later on, as the sovereign debt crisis spread to other 
euro area countries, the Treaty establishing the  
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) laid down the 
principle of considering burden sharing between the 
private sector and the official sector to close the  
financing gap for exceptional cases of stability loans 
to a country in need of debt restructuring. Moreover, 
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the ESM was given the status of preferred creditor 
after the IMF. Greece retrofitted a collection action 
clause based on domestic law in its outstanding bond 
contracts and organised a public debt restructuring 
in March 2012 involving a substantial haircut in  
connection with a second EU/IMF financial support 
programme. Private creditors faced strong political 
pressure to accept this offer in return for significant 
sweeteners (see also Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 2: Official sector claims on euro area governments, 1999-2018  
(percent of GDP) 
Source: ECB, Eurostat, and European Commission economic forecast of spring 2017. 
Note: Euro area in changing composition. 
When in spring 2015 a third financial support  
package was negotiated the Greek government  
demanded a cancellation of unsustainable debt owed 
to official creditors and organised a referendum in 
which the proposed austerity and reform conditions 
were rejected. Given the heightened risks of a  
financial meltdown, the Greek authorities had to  
impose temporary restrictions on financial  
transactions and capital outflows. Although Greece 
reached agreement with its European official lenders 
in August 2015, the IMF refused to join in with  
further financial assistance because it judged that the 
Greek fiscal position was not sustainable without first 
getting debt forgiveness from its euro area partners. 
Meanwhile, the Eurogroup has endorsed short-term 
solutions including maturity extensions and interest 
deferrals leading to a smoother debt repayment  
profile and more favourable debt dynamics (ESM, 
2017). Moreover, it has committed to medium-term 
debt relief and contingency measures, if needed to 
ensure the long-run debt sustainability of Greece  
after it has successfully completed its third  
adjustment programme. 
Cyprus was under pressure from its European  
partners to resolve a banking crisis at the lowest cost 
for taxpayers in order to limit the scale of official  
financial assistance. The national authorities  
therefore agreed in March 2013 to impose a one-off 
stability levy on both insured and uninsured bank  
deposit holders in return for an uncertain promise of 
future compensation. After its national parliament 
had rejected this confiscation as unconstitutional, the 
government decided instead to bail-in the  
shareholders and creditors of the two unviable  
systemic banks, while protecting the value of insured 
retail deposits up to EUR 100.000. Cyprus also had to 
place temporary restrictions on bank transactions, 
deposit withdrawals and capital outflows in order to 
counter a bank run and sustain a captive domestic 
investor base. Substantial capital flight would also 
have complicated the government’s return to the  
capital market. 
 
To facilitate a potential future public debt  
restructuring at the expense of private creditors,  
euro area countries are including as from January 
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2013 euro area collective action clauses (CACs) in the 
terms and conditions of government bond series. 
These should allow all debt securities issued by a 
country to be considered together in negotiations and 
thus make it easier to get a qualified majority of 
bondholders to accept a debt restructuring offer  
rather than to hold out against it.5 On the one hand, 
this expropriation risk should be expected to lead 
investors to demand a higher credit risk premium in 
interest rates. On the other hand, market participants 
might reward the lower costs of dealing with hold out 
creditors with a yield discount. A material impact of 
the introduction of CACs on government bond yields 
was not noticeable; if anything, those euro area  
countries with the weakest fiscal positions enjoyed 
slightly lower interest rates (Bradly and Gulati, 2014; 
Große Steffen and Schumacher, 2014). Hence, the 
CACs were ineffective in countering the moral hazard 
arising from countries now having the option to  
request conditional support and debt relief from the 
ESM. 
 
5. The ECB’s monetary policy interventions 
 
The sovereign debt crisis and the consequent market 
access difficulties for affected governments also 
caused a growing fragmentation of euro area  
financial markets along national lines, which  
seriously impaired the monetary transmission  
mechanism. The ECB responded with interventions 
aimed at repairing the dysfunctional securities  
markets, which helped to keep rising government 
bond yields of crisis-hit countries in check.  
 
First, the ECB decided in May 2010 to intervene  
under its Securities Markets Programme, buying  
limited amounts of the government bonds of Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, and later of Italy and Spain, in 
an effort to stabilise their debt markets and restore a 
smooth operation of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Second, the ECB president pledged in 
July 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the 
euro, within the limits of the ECB’s mandate, after 
market participants increasingly called the continued 
existence of the euro into question. This statement 
was followed by an ECB commitment to undertake 
conditional but unlimited Outright Monetary  
Transactions in disrupted government bond markets in 
case monetary concerns justified such an  
intervention. As a result, crisis-hit countries saw their 
government bond yields declining substantially and 
their previous self-fulfilling default expectations were 
neutralised. 
 
As inflation expectations started sliding down in 
2014, ECB monetary policy turned to fighting low  
inflation in the euro area. Money market rates were 
moved slightly into negative territory to exploit the 
remaining scope for a standard cut in key interest 
rates up to the effective lower bound. Non-standard 
credit operations, quantitative easing measures and 
forward guidance on the monetary stance remaining 
accommodative engineered a substantial decline in 
euro area average longer-term interest rates as well 
as a significant reduction of government bond 
spreads. The aim of the ECB’s exceptional monetary 
accommodation was to ease private financing  
conditions and reflate the euro area economy. As a 
by-product, it translated into significant budgetary 
advantages.  
 
The successful monetary policy efforts to prevent  
deflation avoided an undue rise in the real value of 
public debt. Higher GDP growth and falling  
unemployment boosted tax revenues as a source of 
debt service payments and reduced primary (i.e. non-
interest) expenditure. Government interest payments 
declined to a low level, also because public debt  
managers used the opportunity of ultra-low bond 
yields to lengthen the maturity of new debt issues. By 
late 2018, the Eurosystem will hold some 20% of GDP 
in debt securities issued by euro area governments 
on its balance sheet (Figure 2). The net interest  
received on its growing monetary policy portfolio of 
public and private sector bonds allowed national  
central banks to strengthen their financial buffers 
and to make extra remittances to their governments. 
  
5 The euro area CACs require at least 66.67% (in value terms) of the holders to agree to a change in the payment terms of 
an individual outstanding sovereign bond (which compares with a typical minimum threshold of 75%). Moreover, an 
aggregation clause allows the debtor to apply the modification of the payment terms simultaneously to all outstanding 
sovereign bonds, provided that at least 75% of the holders across all bond series agree. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This note finds that public debt management and  
resolution, European financial legislation, EMU crisis 
support and ECB monetary policy have greatly  
supported euro area governments in dealing with 
their fiscal predicament. Taken together, these public 
policy interventions contributed to a steadily  
declining implicit interest rate paid over the  
outstanding stock of public debt relative to nominal 
GDP growth (Figure 3) and helped to secure or  
enforce public debt sustainability. Although targeted 
at a return to economic and financial stability in the 
wake of the euro area crisis, the measures taken by 
the respective authorities show a distinct similarity 
to the application of financial repression tools known 
from the past.  
 
The advantages of generating fiscal space through 
non-standard means must be weighed against the 
economic costs of treasuries pressing domestic  
investors to adopt a home bias in their sovereign 
portfolios and thus promoting a fragmented EMU  
capital market. In addition, the strong demand for 
public debt generated by a combination of moral  
suasion, financial legislation and supervisory  
pressure could crowd out private credit and become 
a danger to financial stability in new episodes of  
fiscal stress (ESRB, 2015). Furthermore, the  
preferential regulatory treatment of sovereign debt 
in Europe and the ECB’s non-standard monetary  
interventions have likely weakened market-based 
incentives for governments to pursue sound public 
finances and to progress with structural reforms (cf. 
Hoogduin and Wierts, 2012). Moreover, official sector 
support from partner countries and public debt  
resolution at the expense of private creditors  
established large income and wealth transfers to  
crisis-hit countries without a corresponding 
strengthening of market discipline to counter  
excessive sovereign borrowing. The attendant  
longer-term risks for the functioning of EMU need to 
be addressed by giving a stronger role to market 
forces to ensure that euro area countries remain fully 
responsible and accountable for the sustainability of 
their public debt. 
Figure 3: Nominal GDP growth and implicit government interest rate, 1995-2018 
(percent per annum)  
Source: ECB, Eurostat and European Commission economic forecast of spring 2017. 
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